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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic 
growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and 
high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual 
equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal 
policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth 
and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the 
inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical 
results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current 
expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, , being 
public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and 
equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the 
results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront 
when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided. 
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 1. Introduction 
This paper investigates to what extent, and by means of which components, fiscal policy 
has an impact on economic activity and income inequality in a sample of 43 upper-middle and 
high income countries.  
The interactions between economic growth and income inequality have attracted a great 
deal of attention in recent years. While earlier works suggested a negative trade-off between 
growth and inequality in the first stages of development, more recent studies suggest 
mechanisms by which inequality is indeed increased by economic growth or by which income 
inequality affects growth (positively or negatively).  
Seminal studies by Lewis (1954), Kuznets (1955) and Kaldor (1956) suggested that 
income inequality is mostly determined by the level of economic development. More 
precisely, they analysed how economic development affects income distribution in the long-
run suggesting a potential increasing effect of growth on income inequality in the first stages 
of economic development, and a decreasing effect in the later stages (“inverted-U 
hypothesis”).1 More recent studies have put forward new ideas about the effects of economic 
development on income inequality. These works have taken into account three phenomena: 
the rapid growth of international trade (Wood and Ridao-Cano, 1996); the increased diffusion 
of new technologies in different productive activities (Eicher, 1996, Galor and Tsiddon, 1997, 
Aghion et al., 1999, and Hassler and Rodríguez-Mora, 2000), and the emergence of new 
organizational forms (Caroli, 1999). 
In contrast, in the extensive literature on development that has appeared during the 
1990s, the causation between inequality and growth runs in the opposite direction. In fact, the 
central concern mainly focuses on the role of income and wealth inequality in the process of 
economic growth. Two main groups of studies can be identified in this theoretical literature. 
                                                 
1 For theoretical studies of this “inverted-U hypothesis”, see Robinson (1976), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and 
Helpam (1998). In turn, Fields (2001) offers a complete survey of the empirical literature. 
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 One group suggests various transmission channels through which greater initial inequality 
fosters economic growth.2 The other group suggests several economic and political channels 
through which initial inequality might be harmful for growth.3 
 The diversity of theoretical approaches that focus on the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policies; the shortage of empirical contributions examining their impacts for an 
extended set of countries, and the scarcity of works that relate the growth and associated 
distributive effects to different public policies, points to the need for an analysis measuring 
both effects. In this context, our paper does the aforementioned and connects these two 
strands of literature. 
To provide a comprehensive analysis of the growth and distributive effects of different 
fiscal instruments, we consider and estimate separately equations of growth and inequality 
using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-
2006. We begin by considering independent models of growth and inequality (orthogonal 
equations) that incorporate a limited set of control variables commonly found in the literature, 
and evaluate, independently, the impacts of different instruments of fiscal policy on both 
macro-aggregates. According to the above-mentioned literature, there are solid economic 
arguments to believe that income inequality and economic growth determine each other. 
Consequently, our empirical strategy also considers the inclusion of income inequality in the 
growth equation and GDP growth in the inequality equation (structural equations). This 
makes it possible to analyse the relationship between both aggregates and to investigate the 
role of fiscal policy, which has traditionally been considered as an effective instrument for 
generating revenue and for redistributive purposes. The contribution of this paper is thus 
twofold. Firstly, we look simultaneously at GDP growth, income inequality and fiscal policies 
                                                 
2  See Rebelo (1991) and Deaton and Paxson (1997), among others. 
3 For studies that use purely economic reasons see, Aghion and Bolton (1992 and 1997), Galor and Zeira (1993), Piketty 
(1997), Galor and Zan (1997), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and Mookherjee and Ray (2003). For studies that analyse 
the influence of political channels see Gupta (1990), Bertola (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), and Bénabou (1996).  
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 in an extended panel of countries. Secondly, we perform the analysis for a variety of 
disaggregated fiscal measures, both in terms of expense and revenue. 
The results obtained show that fiscal policies have significant effects on growth and 
inequality. Higher direct taxes and current expenditures contract economic growth while, at 
the same time, reduce economic inequality. These results clearly reflect the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity that governments confront when designing their fiscal policies: 
increasing the size of the government diminishes economic growth, although it achieves a 
significant improvement in the equality of incomes. The only fiscal policy that may break this 
trade-off is public investment since, according to the results obtained; increases in this item 
reduce inequality without harming output. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework, where 
different hypotheses concerning the influence of fiscal policies on economic growth and 
inequality are discussed. Section 3 details the data base and discusses the empirical 
methodology. In Section 4 the empirical results are presented, while in Section 5 we test their 
robustness to different assumptions. Finally, section 6 contains our conclusions.  
2. Theoretical framework 
In this section, we first present the theoretical priors underlying the empirical growth 
equations, in particular those related to the role of fiscal policies in economic activity; 
secondly, we present those that allow the impact of fiscal policies on economic inequality to 
be estimated; and lastly, we explain the fiscal variables considered in both models. 
2.1 Fiscal policy and economic growth  
The macroeconomic analysis distinguishes basically two general theoretical approaches 
when analysing the capacity of fiscal policy to affect economic activity. On the one hand, 
from a neoclassical approach, several models emphasise the short-term effects of different 
instruments of fiscal policy. In this approach, the steady-state growth is driven by exogenous 
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 factors, such as the dynamics of population and the technological progress. Thus, the 
conventional wisdom has been that differences in tax and expenditure policies can be 
important determinants of the level of output, but are unlikely to have a significant permanent 
effect on the economic growth rate.4 
The public-policy neoclassical growth models contrast with the predictions of the 
endogenous growth models, where growth is not conducted by exogenous factors. In these 
models, investment in human and physical capital does affect the steady-state growth rate 
and, consequently, there is much more scope for tax and government expenditure to play a 
role in the growth process. These works tend to transform the temporary growth effects of 
fiscal policy that the neoclassical model involves, into permanent effects. Thus, endogenous 
growth models that incorporate public policies predict that distorting taxes, as well as 
productive public expenditures, affect economic growth. It follows that fiscal policy can 
affect the level of output as well as its long-term growth rate.5  
In line with these endogenous approaches, our benchmark equation of economic growth 
is based on the models developed by Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
Additionally, and in order to avoid the biases associated with an incomplete specification of 
the government budget constraint, we follow Kneller et al’s (1999) strategy concerning the 
inclusion of fiscal variables.  
We consider an economy of n producers, each one producing one product (y), according 
to the production function:  
 gAky  1             (1) 
                                                 
4 Sato (1967), Krzyzaniak (1967) and Feldstein (1974) use the neoclassical model to analyse the effects of different taxes on 
growth; Chamely (1986) and Judd (1985) use the model developed by Cass and Koopmans (1965) to study the effects of 
fiscal policy considering endogenous saving rates; Summers (1981) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) adapt the model of 
overlapping generations of Diamond (1965) to analyse the dynamic effects of fiscal policy. 
5 Since the pioneering contributions of Barro (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), and Lucas (1990), several papers have 
extended the analysis of taxation, public expenditure and growth. See, for example, García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007). 
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 where  represents private capital and k g  the public capital used by the producer (what we 
consider the productive public expenditure).  
The government balances its budget in each period by raising a proportional tax on 
output at rate   (distortionary tax) and lump-sum taxes  (non-distortionary taxes). 
Therefore, the budget constraint that the government faces can be expressed as: 
L
nyLbCng        (2) 
where  and g are the non-productive and productive public expenditure, respectively. 
Because we allow for the case of an unbalanced budget, we include a variable b  that collects 
the budgetary surplus (deficit). 
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 According to this strategy, the interpretation of the estimated coefficient of each fiscal 
variable is the effect of a unitary change in the relevant variable (included in the regression) 
offset by a unitary change in the omitted fiscal variable, which is the implicit financial 
element. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the non-omitted fiscal variables 
varies if the omitted category is altered.  
In order to reduce the specification error bias, we consider two growth orthogonal 
equations containing different sets of control variables. Model 1 considers a set of control 
variables based on the Solow growth model that includes the initial level of GDP per capita, 
private investment,6 and population growth. Based on Mankiw-Romer-Weil (1992), and in 
order to control for the impact of human capital accumulation, Model 2 includes the former 
Solow set and incorporates the average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and 
above.  
Previous studies do not take into account inequality when calculating the effects of 
fiscal policy on output. As argued above, we also consider the inclusion of an inequality 
measure in the growth equations allowing for a joint analysis of the macroeconomic and 
distributive effects of fiscal policy, which constitutes a novel feature of our study. Thus, 
Model 3 and 4 (structural equations) expand our benchmark growth equations with the 
addition of an inequality variable (Gini index) in Model 1 and 2, respectively. 
2.2 Fiscal policy and income redistribution 
In contrast with the abundant theoretical literature relating fiscal policy and economic 
growth, contributions about the effects of such policies on income inequality have been very 
scarce until recently. 
For economic inequality, our benchmark equation is based on the empirical approaches 
of Li and Zou (1998), Li, Squire and Zou (1998), Castelló and Doménech (2002) and 
                                                 
6 The private investment variable was specially constructed for this study as a difference of total investment (from Penn 
World Table 6.1) and public investment (from Government Finance Statistics of IMF), as a share of GDP. 
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 Lundberg and Squire (2003). The fiscal policy variables are incorporated following the same 
strategy used for the growth equation that excludes one of the elements of vector FP. Thus, 
the performance of income inequality depends on two sets of non fiscal (Z vector) and fiscal 
(FP vector) variables: 
                       (7)  m
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In line with the aforementioned literature, controls for the inequality equation should 
take into account a measure of civil liberties, and a measure of educational inequality as a 
proxy of assets inequality. This first measure allows consideration for the political control of 
the richest segment of society and their influence on income distribution, given their political 
ability to protect their wealth. On the other hand, the inclusion of an educational inequality 
variable allows us to measure the importance of the distribution of human capital in 
explaining differences in income inequality.7 Finally, the FP vector contains the fiscal 
variables, omitting the variable which we assume as the compensating element within the 
government’s budget constraint. 
In order to reduce the specification error bias, we consider two inequality orthogonal 
equations, Models 5 and 6, the only difference being that the last also includes a dummy 
variable that controls for the difference in the construction of the inequality variable (the 
value is 1 if the income inequality measure is calculated from an income concept net of taxes 
and 0 otherwise). The correspondent part of this strategy consists of the inclusion of economic 
growth in these inequality models, which constitutes our inequality structural equations 
(Model 7 and 8). 
2.3 Fiscal policy variables aggregation  
In line with Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992 and 1995) we classify 
taxes as distorting or not distorting, depending on whether they do or do not affect the private 
                                                 
7 It is important to note that this measure of education refers to the quantity of schooling, and does not take into account the 
quality of the education system (see Castelló and Doménech, 2002; and Castelló-Climent, 2010) 
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 investment decision (with respect to physical and/or human capital) and, therefore, the 
economic growth rate. Similarly, we classify public expenses as productive or non productive, 
depending on whether they are or are not included as arguments in the private production 
function (when classified as productive, public expenses might have a positive direct effect on 
the growth rate).  
In the case of the present study, the existing limitations concerning the availability of 
homogenous country fiscal data provided by the Government Finance Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund (GFS-IMF), forced us to consider a set of seven fiscal variables 
that cover almost 100% of the total public revenues and expenses (see column 1 of Table 1).8 
Following the categories listed on Table 1, we consider, firstly, direct taxes as being 
equivalent to distortionary taxes while indirect taxes are equivalent to non-distortionary 
taxes;9 and secondly, public current expenditure is equivalent to unproductive expenses while 
public investment is equivalent to productive expenses. To these four relevant fiscal variables, 
we add the government budget surplus/deficit, revenues whose classification is ambiguous 
(we label these “other revenues”), and finally, net lending (including net transactions in 
financial assets and liabilities). 
3. Data base and empirical methodology 
 
3.1 Data base 10 
We construct a panel data for an extended set of 43 countries catalogued as high-income 
or upper-middle-income by the World Bank. The selection of countries was determined by 
two important factors. Firstly, in line with Fölster and Henrekson (1999) and Castelló-
Climent (2010), we consider that the empirical analysis of the relationships between growth, 
                                                 
8 We have not included social security contributions in government revenues due to distorting effects. 
9 In other endogenous growth models, like Mendoza et al. (1997), consumption taxation becomes distortionary, with a 
negative effect on growth if leisure is included in the utility function, affecting education/labour-leisure choices and thus 
capital/labour ratios in production. 
10 Appendix 1 provides the definition of all used variables, Appendix 2 the summary statistics, and Appendix 3 the list of the 
countries included. 
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 inequality and size of the government should be restricted to countries with similar wealth 
ranges. Secondly, we consider the availability, frequency, quality and comparability of long 
data series. The panel is unbalanced using five-year average data; it covers the period 1972-
2006, and contains harmonised economic, political and social data obtained from different 
sources.  
Economic variables, related to the product and investment, are taken from Penn World 
Table 6.1. Variables concerning fiscal policies are taken from the Government Finance 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (GFS-IMF). The human capital variables are 
obtained from Barro and Lee (2001); while the Gini index of education is obtained from 
Castelló and Doménech (2002).  
The variables related to income inequality are taken from UNU-WIDER version 2b. 
Since we analyse the impact of government taxes and expenses on economic inequality, we 
use the Gini coefficient calculated with respect to the household disposable equivalent income 
and/or consumption, covering the entire population of the analysed economy. The 
compilation of inequality data carried out by the United Nations has certainly helped to 
improve the empirical analysis of inequality, although the provided data is not always 
methodologically homogeneous between and within countries. In order to build a 
homogeneous and comparable inequality data base, we select and adjust the available 
observations according to the following criteria. Firstly, low quality observations are 
eliminated (quality “4” and “3”, the minor values in the ranking). Secondly, for each country 
we only consider data coming from the same source and survey. Thirdly, in order to maximise 
the sample, we consider household equivalent disposable income as well as consumption by 
the whole population of the country (the coverage had to be representative of the national 
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 population);11 in addition, all uses of consumption had to be accounted for, including own-
consumption. And finally, each country should have a minimum of three observations (with a 
maximum of seven for the period 1972-2006).    
3.2 Empirical methodology 
We consider five-year averages of all variables for different reasons. Firstly, because we 
did not expect year-to-year changes in fiscal policy variables affect yearly changes in 
economic growth and inequality. Secondly, taking five-year averages will reduce the short-
run fluctuations and therefore the influence of the economic cycle, allowing us to focus on the 
structural relationship that is of interest to us. Thirdly, by using five-year means, we partially 
compensate for the limited availability of annual country inequality data, allowing a more 
balanced data set to be considered. Although for most of the variables we have yearly 
observations, our data on Gini coefficients are more limited – many countries have less than 
10 observations, whereas only a few countries have more than 20 annual observations. 
Because our aggregate measures of inequality are relatively stable over time, five-year 
averages will not result in much loss of information.12  
In the empirical estimations we consider five different forms of panel data estimator for 
each regression: pooled OLS, one-way (country dummies) fixed effects (by OLS) and random 
effects (by GLS), and two-way (country and time effects) fixed and random effects models. 
We select the model specification according to the value of the log-likelihood function and 
the adjusted 2R . 
In the growth equation, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the individual effects and the error term, showing the convenience of estimating a 
fixed effects model. According to these criteria, the growth equations (Models 1 to 4) are 
                                                 
11 As an exception, we have included UNU-WIDER version 2b data from two countries (Argentina and Uruguay) for which 
only urban area inequality figures were reported, the reason being that in both countries the urban population represents 
almost 90 percent of their total population. 
12 Examples that have used the same procedure are Li and Zou (1998), Li, Squire and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), Li, Xu, and 
Zou (2000), Lundberg and Squire (2003), and Barro (2008), among others. 
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 estimated through a two-way fixed effects model. This enables us to control for cross-country 
heterogeneity as well as period-specific factors common to all cross-section units. Among 
other things, the unobserved country-specific effects may reflect differences in the initial level 
of efficiency, whilst the period-specific intercepts pick up productivity changes that are 
common to all countries. 
In relation to the inequality equation, we should point to two important aspects 
concerning the economic inequality variable used (Gini index). Firstly, this variable is 
relatively stable within countries during the analysed period; and, secondly, it changes 
significantly between countries (see Appendix 2). Therefore, the statistical primary results 
offer sufficient evidence that inequality is determined by factors that differ substantially 
between countries though they tend to be relatively stable inside the same ones.13 Thus, in the 
inequality equations (Models 5 to 8), considering a fixed effects model which ignores the 
between country variation and imposes too many restrictions was not viewed as the most 
adequate empirical strategy (see Baltagui, 2008). The most appropriate specification taking 
into account the aforementioned criteria is a one-way random effects model using temporal 
dummies. 
4. Empirical Results  
 In this section we present the estimations of the different model specifications with 
respect to the impact of public expenditures and taxes on economic growth and also the 
effects of such fiscal policies on income inequality. 
 
4.1. The effects of fiscal policy on growth 
Table 2 summarises the results of the empirical growth models considering no relation 
between growth and inequality (orthogonal equations), and allowing for the influence of 
                                                 
13 An analysis of the variance components (ANOVA) of the Gini coefficients shows that, for the entire sample, 91.8% of the 
variance is cross-country. 
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 inequality on economic growth (structural equations). In each model, we consider first 
indirect taxes, and second direct taxes, as the implicit financing element. Finally, we only 
report the estimates of relevant and significant fiscal variables (other revenues, net lending, 
and the surplus/deficit variables are neither statistically nor economically significant).  
A first noteworthy result is that the estimations of the orthogonal and structural 
equations are very similar; none of the control and fiscal policy variables present significant 
changes between both types of equations.  
We begin by discussing the results concerning the control variables. We find that initial 
GDP enters into the regressions with a significant negative coefficient, indicating a 
conditional convergence of growth rates over the period; this result is in line with those 
obtained by Barro (1991, 2008), Kneller et al. (1999), and Castelló-Climent (2010), but 
contradicts Easterly and Rebelo (1993). Private investment has a significant and positive 
effect on growth; a result that differs with that obtained by Kneller et al (1999), where a 
measure of the total investment (private and public) is considered and found to be not 
significant, possibly reflecting problems of collinearity with the measures of fiscal policy that 
include public investment.14 Population growth, as in  Lin et al. (2009), is significant and 
presents the expected negative sign, something which again contrasts with the non significant 
coefficient that, using the workforce growth variable, Kneller et al. (1999) obtain. Finally, as 
in Barro (1991), the initial stock of human capital is significant and positively related to 
economic growth.  
The signs of the relevant fiscal variables are consistent with theory. Thus, current 
expenditure has a negative and significant impact on GDP growth, regardless of whether it is 
financed by direct or indirect taxes; however, this negative impact is greater when the implicit 
financing elements are direct taxes. This negative coefficient, which was also obtained by 
                                                 
14 For studies that find a positive and significant coefficient of total investment to GDP ratio on growth, see, for example, 
Voitchovsky (2005) and Lin et al. (2009), among others. 
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 Barro (1990 and 2008) and Castelló-Climent (2010), can be interpreted in several ways. 
Firstly, it is possible that part of that government spending is somehow wasteful. Secondly, it 
is also possible that government spending is just a proxy for the entire set of government non-
price interventions (like employment legislation, health and safety rules and product 
standards), and, it may be that these non-price interventions are responsible for reducing 
growth, and not the level of expenditure. 
Public investment is positive and with a smaller coefficient than private investment but 
it is not statistically significant, regardless of whether it is financed by direct or indirect taxes. 
Considering that public investment is constituted mainly by investment in infrastructures, one 
would expect that it influences the rate of economic growth both positively and directly. 
According to this argument, our result would be somehow surprising; however, as Romp and 
Haan (2007) and Kamps (2005) summarise, this positive but non-significant impact could be 
explained because the effect of public investment may differ considerably across the countries 
included in our sample. 
A significant negative effect is found in the case of direct taxes. This result, which is 
also obtained by Kneller et al. (1999), is consistent with economic theory because of the 
distorting effects of this type of taxes. In contrast, indirect taxes do not have a significant 
impact on growth.  
An important additional result derived from the structural equations is that income 
inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, harms economic growth.15 This result is 
consistent with the early 1990s empirical growth literature based on a cross-country approach 
(see Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1994 and 1996)), and also with more recent 
studies that use a panel data approach (Huang et al., 2009). However, the negative effect of 
inequality on growth is contradictory with the conventional textbook indicating that inequality 
                                                 
15 To reduce any inconsistency resulting from the fact that some Gini coefficients are based on income, whereas a few are 
based on expenditure; in this structural equation we follow Deniniger and Squire’s suggestion and add 6.6 to gini coefficients 
based on expenditure. 
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 is good for incentives and therefore good for growth,16 and also differs from the empirical 
studies of Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), Barro (2000), Lundberg and 
Squire (2003), and Castelló-Climent (2010). Despite the fact that these latter papers also use a 
panel data approach, it is important to underline some important differences with respect to 
our work here. Firstly, they consider initial inequality as an explanatory variable while we use 
a continuous Gini variable constructed taking into consideration disposable income or 
expenditure; secondly, they use different estimation methods; and thirdly, the sets of control 
variables, countries and period considered are also different. 
Given that in this empirical model we are considering fiscal policy variables, we think 
that the significant and negative impact of inequality on growth cannot be explained only by 
the traditional arguments based on the political economy literature (see Alesina and Rodrik 
1994; and Benabou, 1996; among others). Additionally, given that we also control for 
investment (in human and physical capital), this result would indicate that income inequality 
has a direct negative effect on growth not coming from its effect on investment decisions.17 In 
a context of upper-middle and high income economies, and considering that capital markets 
are imperfect and the agents are heterogeneous, one possible explanation could arise to 
explain the estimated negative effects of inequality on growth. Inequality is detrimental to 
growth, as borrowers tend to under-invest in effort when it is unobservable; when there are 
incentive problems, the more unequal the income distribution is, the lower the aggregate level 
of effort will be (see, for example, Aghion and Bolton, 1997). 
 
4.2. Distributional effects of fiscal policy 
The inequality equations allow the distributive effects of fiscal policies to be analysed. 
In Table 3 we present the main results obtained with the orthogonal and structural equations 
                                                 
16 The traditional visions propose a positive effect of inequality on growth due to different rates of saving of rich and poor 
individuals (Kaldor, 1956 and 1957), and due to incentive effects (Rebelo, 1991). 
17 For works that analyse the role of investment to explain a negative impact of inequality on growth, see Banerjee and 
Newman (1993); and Piketty (1997). 
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 of inequality detailed in section 2.2. In each model, the first column shows the results 
considering indirect taxes as the implicit financing element, while the second column uses 
direct taxes. We only report the estimates of the relevant fiscal variables (other revenues, net 
lending, and the surplus/deficit variables are neither statistically nor economically 
significant). 
The results of the orthogonal and structural equations are very similar and do not change 
in terms of significance, sign and magnitude of the control variables. In both types of 
equations, the control variables are significant and with the expected sign, which basically 
coincides with the results of Li and Zou (1998), and Li et al. (1998). Thus, increases in initial 
civil liberties index reduce income inequality while an increase in initial educational 
inequality increases income inequality. It is remarkable that educational inequality, as a proxy 
of assets inequality, has a much greater influence than those associated with political 
economy arguments, as is also pointed out by Li et al. (1998). It is also important to 
emphasise that the dummy variable that controls for the differences caused by the different 
source of the Gini indices, which is incorporated in Model 6 and 8, is significant and increases 
the explanatory power of both types of equations (orthogonal and structural). 
Concerning the fiscal variables, it is noteworthy that current public expenditure has a 
significant and sizeable negative effect on income inequality; it reduces income inequality 
regardless of whether it is financed by direct or indirect taxes. This result is consistent with 
Bulir and Gulde (1995), Gustafsson and Johansson (1999), Li et al. (2000), Galli and van der 
Hoeven (2001), and Alfonso et al. (2010). One would expect that this type of expenditure 
reduces income inequality because it includes different social expenses with distributive 
implications through the immediate benefits, for example, expenses in transfers like pensions 
or different subsidies.  
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 The effect of public investment on inequality is slight and not statistically significant in 
the orthogonal equations. However, the effect of this variable is negative and statistically 
significant in the structural regressions. This latter result showing a reduction in inequality is 
in line with the arguments of Brennenman and Kerf (2002) and with the empirical results 
obtained with a sample of Latin-American countries by Calderón and Servén (2004). 
Conceptually, the development of public infrastructures helps underdeveloped areas of the 
economy to be connected to the cores of economic activity, allowing access to additional 
productive opportunities. Another argument along these lines is that infrastructures also 
improve access to help and education services. 
The effect of direct taxes on inequality is negative and significant; nevertheless, the 
estimated coefficients are much smaller than those corresponding to current expenditure. This 
result is in line with Chu, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) for developing countries!!! (what we 
do? quot or not?). This negative impact may reflect the progressive structure of the tax 
systems of the analysed countries, many of them with a modern fiscal system. With a 
progressive tax system, increases in direct tax revenue – whether through increases in the tax 
base, in the overall average tax rate or in the progression of the tax structure – would yield a 
larger redistributive effect and thus lower inequality (Lambert, 2001). Finally, indirect taxes 
have a positive coefficient but not significant. 
Lastly, the results obtained with the structural equations clearly show that economic 
growth has a statistically significant and negative effect on inequality. Considering that our 
sample contains a group of high-income and upper-middle-income countries, this result is in 
line with a Kuznets-type relationship. 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we test the robustness of our main results by modifying some aspects of 
the estimated growth and inequality equations. In both cases, we begin by testing if the 
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 coefficients of the fiscal variables are sensitive to the inclusion of new control variables in 
both equations.  
Additionally, we use instrumental variables to examine the possibility of simultaneity 
between fiscal variables, growth and inequality. We deal with endogeneity in both equations 
by using the five-year lagged values of our endogenous explanatory variables as instruments. 
The use of five-year lagged values as instruments is justified for three reasons (Murray, 
2006). Firstly, it is unlikely that economic growth and inequality will today affect past values 
of our fiscal policy variables. Secondly, the lagged values of these variables are correlated 
with the values without lags. Lastly, the only impact of these lagged values on economic 
growth and inequality must pass through the endogenous variables. This is suggested by the 
fact that including the explanatory endogenous variables and their five-year lagged values in 
the same regression yields no statistically significant effect of the latter.  
Finally, in order to fathom whether the results are being driven by one particular country 
in our sample, we repeat the regressions of growth and inequality after removing each of the 
countries one at time. The results, in both equations, are stable indicating that no single 
country is driving our results. 
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis I: The growth equations. 
In first instance, we conduct a stepwise regression analysis by adding other variables 
discussed in the growth literature on Model 2 and 4 (those that also include a human capital 
variable). The works of Barro (1990), Mendoza et al. (1997) and Lundberg and Squire 
(2003), provide the new variables considered in this sensitivity analysis which are trade, 
inflation, financial development, and a measure of civil liberties. We report the results 
including only the variables that are significant (trade and inflation).18 Columns 1 to 4 of 
Table 4 report the results of this sensitivity exercise.  
                                                 
18 The significance and signs of the relevant fiscal variables remain unchanged including all new control variables. 
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 Unfortunately there are well known problems with estimating growth regressions. The 
right-hand-side variables are typically endogenous,19 and measured with error. Another 
difficulty is that of omitted variables. One variable that should be included in a conditional 
convergence regression, the initial level of efficiency, is not observed. One way to address 
these problems has been through a first-difference generalised method of moments estimators 
applied to dynamic panel data models. The developments in dynamic panel data models (e.g., 
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Kviet, 1995) have focused mainly on 
those applications to micro data sets, which generally have a large cross-section dimension 
but a limited time series dimension (large N, small T). These properties also typically match 
the dimensions of our data based on five-year average (N around 43, T around 7) well. So, in 
second instance, we estimate a dynamic panel data model, and, apply a two-step GMM 
estimator.20 The second four columns of table 4 report the results of this sensitivity exercise. 
Throughout this sensitivity analysis, three main results emerge clearly. Firstly, the 
inclusion of new variables is not responsible for the strong fiscal effects identified earlier; the 
significance of the fiscal variables is not sensitive to the inclusion of these macro variables. 
Secondly, two of the new variables considered are significant and with the expected sign 
showing that an increase in international trade raises economic growth while an increase in 
inflation reduces it; both results were also found by Mendoza et al. (1997), Barro (1990), and 
Castelló-Climent (2010); respectively. Finally, if we look at the results in Table 4 of the 
dynamic models with IV, we observe that the coefficients, signs and significance of inequality 
and all the relevant fiscal variables remain unchanged indicating that the effects identified 
earlier are not simply the result of endogeneity. Therefore, the interpretation of the role of key 
                                                 
19 Obvious candidates in this case are private investment and fiscal variables. 
20 In studying economic growth, this procedure has important advantages over simple cross-section regressions and other 
methods for dynamic panel data models, such as the one-step GMM procedure. Firstly, estimates will no longer be biased by 
any omitted variables that are constant over the time (“fixed” effects). In conditional convergence regressions, this avoids the 
problem raised by the omission of initial efficiency. Secondly, the use of instrumental variables allows parameters to be 
estimated consistently in models which include endogenous right-hand-side variables such as private investment and fiscal 
variables. Finally, the use of instruments potentially allows consistent estimation even in the presence of measurement error. 
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 fiscal variables on growth is substantially unaffected: increasing the size of government 
(through current expenditure and direct taxes) reduces economic growth while an increase in 
inequality reduces economic growth.  
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis II: The inequality equations 
In the case of the inequality equations, we proceed with a similar strategy to that 
employed in the growth equations. In first instance, we conduct a stepwise regression analysis 
by adding other control variables discussed in the inequality literature. Thus, the selection of 
the additional variables to include (inflation, private investment, trade and initial GDP), is 
based on the contributions of de Li, Squire and Zou (1998) and Li and Zou (2002).  
In turn, while the data panel on growth and its determinants is big enough to introduce 
dynamics to the model, the data panel on income inequality is rather limited (for some 
countries there are only three available observations on an extended sample of seven five-year 
periods). In addition, the most common approach to estimate dynamic panel data models is 
the first-difference Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. This estimator takes 
first differences in order to eliminate the source of inconsistency and uses the levels of the 
lagged explanatory variables as instruments. However, by taking first differences, most of the 
variation of the inequality data, which comes basically from variability across countries, 
disappears. Hampered by these econometric difficulties and data limitations, the estimation of 
a dynamic panel data equation with instruments is not a viable option. Since our main concern 
is endogeneity, which is constantly raised in income distribution literature (see for example, 
Li and Zou, 1998), we apply the instrumental variables method (IV) via two-stage least 
squares to correct for the endogeneity of the fiscal variables. 
Table 5 reports the results of this two sensitivity analysis applied to the inequality 
equations. In columns 1 to 4, we show the results adding the trade variable to the orthogonal 
and structural inequality equations corresponding to Model 6 and 8 (trade is the only 
 20
 additional variable which turns out to be significant at least in some of the new regressions).21 
In columns 5 to 8, we present the instrumental variables (IV) estimation results of both 
inequality equations when the five-year lagged values of the independent variables are used as 
a set of instruments, since there is usually no correlation between the disturbance and the 
lagged values (see Iimi, 2005; and, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya,  2007). 
Two main results emerge clearly from Table 5. Firstly, throughout the sensitivity 
analysis, public current expenditure and direct taxes remain significant and the estimated 
coefficients are similar to those of the original regressions on Table 3; therefore these results 
appear to be quite robust to the inclusion of new variables and to instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation.  Secondly, we also observe that public investment has a significant impact on 
inequality. Hence, we confirm the result obtained in the benchmark model using the structural 
equations in the sense that public investment reduces the levels of economic inequality. 
Taking into account that this investment is constituted mainly by infrastructures, one would 
expect that it reduces income inequality indirectly, as explained before.  
6. Conclusions 
Recent times have seen government spending, taxation, and deficit financing move to 
the forefront of policy analysis. Fiscal policy affects aggregate demand, the distribution of 
wealth, and the economy’s capacity to produce goods and services. However, the majority of 
existing empirical studies have focused on the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity 
without considering the redistributive effects and, not offering, in turn, an analysis of the 
impact of different fiscal policy instruments.  
In this paper, we consider an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income 
countries for the period 1972-2006 to show that both the magnitude and the composition of 
the fiscal policy have significant impacts not only on economic growth but also on economic 
                                                 
21 The inclusion of additional not significant variables did not change the significance and sign of fiscal variables. 
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 inequality. Therefore, different fiscal policies could be used to affect both growth and income 
distribution.  
Regarding the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies, our empirical results are in 
agreement with those found in other empirical studies and suggest that cuts of direct taxes 
increase GDP, whereas increases of public current expenditures diminish it. Beyond that, and 
unlike other empirical work, our results also show that different fiscal policies have 
significant redistributive effects: an increase of public expenditure (current or in public 
investment) produces significant reductions in income inequality, as does increasing direct 
taxes. Moreover, the estimation of structural equations, where a relation of mutual influence 
between growth and inequality is allowed for, shows that a reduction in income inequality 
stimulates economic growth, whereas the process of economic growth reduces economic 
inequality. Consequently, these results suggest that some previously omitted characteristics of 
growth are related to inequality, and vice versa; therefore we could argue that the orthogonal 
equations were probably suffering from omitted variables bias. In any case, the results of both 
types of equations considered are very consistent showing that different fiscal policies have 
significant growth and distributive effects in the analysed economies. On the other hand, 
sensitivity analyses indicate that our macroeconomic results are robust to the inclusion of 
other control variables and also to different estimation techniques considering endogeneity 
problems.  
From a policy perspective, our results have clear implications. According to our 
estimates, increasing the size of the public sector (through current expenditures and direct 
taxes) improves the distribution of income at the expense of economic growth. The effects of 
indirect taxes on both output and inequality are found to be statistically insignificant. The 
only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity is public 
investment, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. The latter 
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 results point on the same direction of García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007) providing 
empirical support to the possibility of fiscal policies increasing the size of government -
throughout indirect taxes to finance public investment- that increase economic growth 
reducing simultaneously inequality. 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Theoretical aggregation of fiscal policy 
Theoretical classification Government Finance Statistics classification 
Direct taxes  Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains 
 Taxes on payroll and workforce 
 Taxes on property 
Indirect taxes  Taxes on goods and services 
 Taxes on international trade and transactions 
Other revenues  Other taxes 
 Grants 
 Other revenue 
Current public expenditure  Compensation of employees 
 Use of goods and services  
 Consumption of fixed capital 
 Interest 
 Subsidies 
 Grants 
 Social benefits 
 Other expense 
Public Investment  Net acquisition of non financial assets  
Transactions in financial assets and liabilities  Net acquisition of financial assets  
 Net incurrence of liabilities   
Government Surplus/Deficit  Total revenues minus total outlays  
Notes: The classification is based on the manual GFS 2001 and corresponds to the General Government.  
 
 Table 2 – Economic Growth. Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth  
 ORTHOGONAL EQUATIONS STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Omitted Fiscal Variable: Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes 
Initial GDP p.c. -0.0100*** -0.0103*** -0.0079*** -0.0078*** -0.0086*** -0.0102*** -0.0095*** -0.0106*** 
Inequality -- -- -- -- -0.0128*** -0.0099*** -0.0109** -0.0091** 
Private investment 0.0053*** 0.0044*** 0.0046*** 0.0032*** 0.0073** 0.0065*** 0.0061*** 0.0046* 
Population growth -0.0004* -0.0020 -0.0014*** -0.0012*** -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** 
Human capital -- -- 0.0044* 0.0036** -- -- 0.0038** 0.0029 
Public investment 0.0018* 0.0017 0.0015 0.0011 0.0019 0.0020 0.0021 0.0022 
Current public expenditure -0.0053*** -0.0090*** -0.0077*** -0.0096*** -0.0073*** -0.0103*** -0.0085*** -0.0110*** 
Direct taxes -0.0039*** Omitted -0.0042*** Omitted -0.0051*** Omitted -0.0042** Omitted 
Indirect taxes Omitted 0.0022* Omitted 0.0001 Omitted 0.0009 Omitted 0.0003 
Adjusted 2R  0.60 0.59 0.57 0.54 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.53 
No. of observations 149 146 130 128 117 114 104 102 
No. of countries 43 43 35 35 41 41 33 33 
Notes:  Estimation technique: 5-years averages, two-way fixed effects. All explanatory variables are expressed in logs except population growth.  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
 
Table 3 – Income Inequality. Dependent variable: log of Gini Index 
 ORTHOGONAL EQUATIONS STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 
Omitted Fiscal Variable: Indirect 
Taxes 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Direct Taxes Indirect 
Taxes 
Direct Taxes Indirect 
Taxes 
Direct Taxes 
Civil liberties 0.0427** 0.0510** 0.0484** 0.0558*** 0.0673*** 0.0562** 0.0756*** 0.0564** 
Education inequality 0.1056** 0.1080** 0.1026** 0.1042** 0.0812* 0.1035* 0.0784 0.1014* 
Growth -- -- -- -- -0.017* -0.0139 -0.0162* -0.0128 
Public investment -0.0411 -0.0634** -0.0525* -0.0692** -0.0450 -0.0680* -0.0604** -0.0778** 
Current public expenditure -0.1974*** -0.2948*** -0.2555*** -0.3320*** -0.2318*** -0.3113*** -0.3262*** -0.3811*** 
Direct taxes -0.0857*** Omitted -0.0702** Omitted -0.0680* Omitted -0.0385* Omitted 
Indirect taxes Omitted 0.0510 Omitted 0.0410 Omitted 0.0672 Omitted 0.1175 
Disposable income dummy -- -- 0.0780* 0.0827* -- -- 0.0935** 0.096** 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.65 0.63 
No. of observations 110 109 110 109 101 100 101 100 
No. of countries 35 35 35 35 34 34 34 34 
Notes:  Estimation technique: 5-years averages, random effects model with temporal dummies. All the variables are expressed in logs. 
 * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
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 Table 4 – Sensitivity Analysis I. Economic Growth – Dependent variable: Real per capital GDP growth  
 More control variables on Model 2 and 4 Dynamics on Model 2 and 4 with IV 
 Orthogonal equations Structural equations Orthogonal equations Structural equations 
Omitted Fiscal Variable: Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes 
Initial GDP p.c. -0.0072*** -0.0077*** -0.0078** -0.0085** -- -- -- -- 
(GDP p.c. growth t-1) -- -- -- -- -0.3548*** -0.5133*** -0.3552*** -0.4968*** 
Inequality -- -- -0.0066 -0.0046 -- -- -0.0070* -0.0111** 
Private investment 0.0032** 0.0022 0.0042 0.0025 0.0050 0.0073* 0.0030 -0.0036 
Population growth -0.0015*** -0.0012*** -0.0019*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0003 
Inflation -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0006* -0.0012*** -- -- -- -- 
International trade 0.0057*** 0.0066*** 0.0046* 0.0062* -- -- -- -- 
Human capital 0.0040* 0.0030 0.0027 0.0011 0.0082** 0.0094*** 0.0040 0.0049* 
Public investment 0.0014 0.0011 0.0015 0.0013 0.0015 0.0033 -0.0026 0.0010 
Current public expenditure -0.0097*** -0.0121*** -0.0092*** -0.0122*** -0.0164*** -0.0116** -0.0268*** -0.0279*** 
Direct taxes -0.0045*** Omitted -0.0038** Omitted -0.0035* Omitted -0.0068*** Omitted 
Indirect taxes Omitted 0.0003 Omitted 0.0006 Omitted 0.0022 Omitted 0.0022 
Adjusted 2R  0.63 0.60 0.55 0.52 -- -- -- -- 
p-value for Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions 
-- -- -- -- 0.49 0.80 0.98 0.96 
p-value for the test of no-first-order 
serial correlation 
-- -- -- -- 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.10 
No. of observations 121 119 97 95 57 55 41 39 
No. of countries 33 33 31 31 29 29 23 22 
Notes:  Estimation technique: 5-years averages, two-way fixed effects; Dynamic model - two-step GMM estimator. All explanatory variables are expressed in 
logs except population growth. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 5 – Sensitivity Analysis II. Income Inequality. Dependent variable: log of Gini Index 
 More control variables on Model 6 and 8 Instrumental Variables on Model 6 and 8 
 Orthogonal equations Structural equations Orthogonal equations Structural equations 
Omitted Fiscal Variable: Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes 
Civil liberties 0.0499* 0.0553* 0.0731** 0.0585* 0.0938* 0.0250 0.0644 0.0466 
Education inequality 0.0985** 0.1129** 0.0733* 0.0993* 0.0856 0.1034** 0.1010 0.1568 
Growth -- -- -0.0114 -0.0083 -- -- -0.0090 -0.0106 
Public investment -0.0530 -0.0854*** -0.0647* -0.1043*** -0.3181** -0.4289** -0.2679* -0.4451 
Current public expenditure -0.2394*** -0.3465*** -0.3180*** -0.4176*** -0.4571*** -0.5365*** -0.4483*** -0.6204*** 
Direct taxes -0.0738** Omitted -0.0452* Omitted -0.0583*** Omitted -0.0619** Omitted 
Indirect taxes Omitted 0.0823** Omitted 0.0956** Omitted 0.04385 Omitted 0.1176 
International trade -0.0658* -0.0953** -0.0441 -0.0668 -- -- -- -- 
Disposable income dummy 0.1125** 0.1212** 0.1174** 0.1252** 0.1134*** 0.1165*** 0.1232** 0.1256** 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.34 0.59 0.45 0.39 
No. of observations 103 101 95 93 67 67 63 61 
No. of countries 33 33 32 32 29 29 28 27 
Notes: Estimation technique: 5-years averages, random effects model with temporal dummies; IV two-stage least squares. All the variables are 
expressed in logs except disposable income dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
 
 Appendix 1: Sources and Definitions of Data Used in Regressions 
International Trade: World Development Indicators of World Bank (WDI), exports plus 
imports as a share of GDP. 
Population growth: World Development Indicators of World Bank (WDI), annual 
growth rate of population.  
Civil liberties: Freedom House: index on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the 
higher level and 7 representing the lower level.  
Education inequality: Castelló and Doménech (2002), Gini index of education. 
Inequality of income: UNU-WIDER version 2b, Gini index.  
Private Investment: Penn World Tables 6.1 and Government Finance Statistics of 
International Monetary Fund (GFS-IMF), Total investment (PWT 6.1) minus 
public investment (GFS-IMF) as a share of GDP. 
Human Capital: Barro and Lee (2001), average years of schooling of the population 
aged 25 and over. 
Inflation: World Development Indicators of World Bank (WDI), december-to-december 
change in consumer price index in logs (CPI). 
GDP: Penn World Table 6.1 database, Real GDP per capita in logs (RGDPCH, 2002 
PPP$). 
GDP growth - Penn World Table 6.1 database, annual GDP growth (GDPt – GDPt-1) 
Current public expense: Government Finance Statistics of International Monetary Fund 
(GFS-IMF), current expenditure of general government as a share of GDP. 
Public Investment: Government Finance Statistics of International Monetary Fund 
(GFS-IMF), public investment of general government as a share of GDP.  
Direct taxes: Government Finance Statistics of International Monetary Fund (GFS-
IMF), revenues of general government due to direct taxes as a share of GDP. 
Indirect taxes: Government Finance Statistics of International Monetary Fund (GFS-
IMF), revenues of general government due to indirect taxes as a share of GDP. 
Transactions in financial assets and liabilities: Government Finance Statistics of 
International Monetary Fund (GFS-IMF), revenues minus expenses in financial 
assets as a share of GDP  
Other revenues: Government Finance Statistics of International Monetary Fund (GFS-
IMF), revenues of general government due to other taxes, grants and other 
revenues as a share f GDP. 
Government Surplus/Deficit: Government Finance Statistics of International Monetary 
Fund (GFS-IMF), total revenues minus total outlays of general government as a 
share of GDP. 
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 Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
GDP growth Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.22 2.83 
1.70 
2.52 
-21.49 
-3.99 
-15.44 
13.96 
5.97 
10.65 
N=284 
n=43 
T-bar= 6.60 
Log (Initial GDP) Overall 
Between 
Within 
8.75 2.47 
1.97 
1.52 
0 
2.60 
3.54 
10.80 
10.22 
15.50 
N=301 
N=43 
T=7 
Inequality of income Overall 
Between 
Within 
34.48 9.09 
8.67 
2.64 
18.66 
22.29 
25.74 
58.7 
52.77 
43.02 
N = 235 
n = 43 
T-bar = 5.46 
Current public expense Overall 
Between 
Within 
17.18 5.64 
5.28 
2.04 
3.99 
6.88 
10.54 
39.34 
32.31 
24.76 
N = 284 
n = 43 
T-bar = 6.60 
Public investment Overall 
Between 
Within 
4.38 1.72 
1.40 
1.12 
1.13 
1.90 
1.78 
9.10 
7.35 
7.97 
N = 178 
n = 43 
T-bar = 4.14 
Private investment Overall 
Between 
Within 
15.99 7.18 
6.07 
3.26 
2.22 
5.35 
1.73 
45.91 
36.92 
26.07 
N = 178 
n = 43 
T-bar = 4.14 
Direct taxes Overall 
Between 
Within 
11.97 6.53 
6.32 
1.97 
1.67 
2.17 
3.76 
31.90 
28.35 
20.89 
N = 242 
n = 43 
T-bar = 5.63 
Indirect taxes Overall 
Between 
Within 
9.73 3.97 
3.72 
1.90 
0.01 
2.58 
0.98 
24.30 
18.82 
16.84 
N = 205 
n = 42 
T-bar = 4.88 
Other revenues Overall 
Between 
Within 
27.94 11.70 
10.69 
5.19 
4.43 
8.88 
14.82 
56.83 
45.42 
44.43 
N = 233 
n = 43 
T-bar = 5.42 
Transactions in financial assets and 
liabilities 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.99 4.84 
2.76 
3.96 
-6.69 
-2.00 
-9.72 
44.39 
11.88 
34.50 
N = 236 
n = 43 
T-bar = 5.49 
Government Surplus/Deficit Overall 
Between 
Within 
4.20 6.23 
4.00 
4.78 
-16.20 
-6.20 
-13.68 
28.10 
14.77 
18.66 
N = 263 
n = 43 
T-bar = 6.11 
Population growth Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.89 0.79 
0.71 
0.37 
-1.33 
-0.13 
-0.70 
3.15 
2.44 
1.96 
N = 301 
n = 43 
T = 7 
Human capital Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.26 1.21 
1.08 
0.57 
0.39 
0.80 
0.77 
5.08 
4.66 
3.55 
N = 247 
n = 36 
T-bar = 6.86 
International trade Overall 
Between 
Within 
75.54 42.24 
39.97 
15.05 
13.49 
20.17 
11.23 
231.53 
190.47 
143.16 
N = 269 
n = 42 
T-bar = 6.40 
Inflation Overall 
Between 
Within 
14.71 26.30 
17.91 
21.00 
-0.34 
2.00 
-49.31 
198.51 
76.66 
166.44 
N = 272 
n = 43 
T-bar = 6.32 
Education inequality Overall 
Between 
Within 
26.57 11.63 
10.82 
4.57 
9.3 
12.7 
8.85 
66.00 
54.5 
43.32 
N = 252 
n = 36 
T = 7 
Civil liberties Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.10 1.68 
1.29 
1.13 
1 
1 
-1.47 
7 
5.33 
6.10 
N= 284 
n = 43 
T-bar = 6.60 
 
Sources:  Fiscal variables come from GFS - FMI 
               The Gini coefficient comes from UNU-WIDER version 2b 
               Investment and GDP come from Penn World Table 6.1 
               Education comes from Barro and Lee (2001) 
               Trade and inflation come from World Development Indicators of the World Bank (WDI-WB) 
               The Gini of education come from Castelló and Domènech (2002) 
               The variable of civil liberties comes from Freedom House, 2007 
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Appendix 3: Sample of countries 
High Income (22): 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea Republic, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
Upper middle income (21): 
Argentina, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Jamaica, Latvia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Peru, Poland, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Turkey and Uruguay. 
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